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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
It has long been established that an employer, as part of 
its obligation under the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., to bargain in good faith 
with a union, must furnish to the union all information relevant 
to the union’s bargaining obligations.  In this case, a union 
representing certain employees of a healthcare network learned 
that the network was being sold to another entity.  And it also 
learned –– from the employer itself –– that the sale agreement 
contained information bearing on the terms and conditions of 
its members’ employment.  So the union asked the employer 
for a full copy of the sale agreement for “effects bargaining.”  
But the employer, asserting that the agreement was 
confidential and not relevant to collective bargaining, refused 
to provide any of it.  Eventually, the union filed unfair labor 
charges with the National Labor Relations Board (the 
“Board”), which found that at least part of the agreement was 
indeed relevant and that the employer, in failing to turn it over, 
violated the NLRA.  As a remedy, the Board ordered the 
employer to provide a complete, unredacted copy of the 
agreement to the union.  The employer now petitions us to 
review the Board’s order, and the Board cross-petitions to 
enforce it.  For the following reasons, we conclude that 
substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that the 
employer violated the NLRA, but we also conclude that the 
Board abused its broad remedial discretion in ordering the 
employer to disclose the entire agreement.  We therefore will 
grant the employer’s petition in part and deny it in part, grant 
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the Board’s cross-petition in part and deny it in part, and 






Crozer-Keystone Health System (“Crozer”) is a 
healthcare network that –– at least at the start of this litigation 
–– comprised four hospitals1 and several other healthcare 
facilities.  Crozer’s employees, at all relevant times, consisted 
of ten bargaining units, represented in total by five unions.  
This case is about Crozer’s interactions with one of those 
unions –– the Pennsylvania Association of Staff Nurses and 
Allied Professionals (the “Union”). 
 
The Union heard rumors about the sale of Crozer 
beginning in fall 2015 and engaged in discussions with the 
putative buyer, Prospect Medical Holdings (“Prospect”), in 
approximately November 2015.  In January 2016, Crozer 
informed the Union that it had reached a “Definitive 
Agreement” to be acquired by Prospect.  Joint Appendix 
(“J.A.”) 59.  Crozer shared with the Union a letter to all Crozer 
employees and physicians about the Prospect sale on January 
8, 2016 (the “January 8 letter”).  In that letter, Crozer explained 
that several things would not change “under [the] Definitive 
Agreement with Prospect.”  Id.  Crozer wrote that “Prospect 
will offer to hire active non-union employees in good standing 
at the rate of pay, title and seniority level at time of close, 
 
1 Two of those hospitals, Crozer-Chester Medical 




subject to standard pre-employment screening processes.”  Id.  
And Crozer explained that “unionized employees in good 
standing will be offered employment subject to initial terms set 
by Prospect,” which would “meet with the various labor 
organizations that represent [Crozer] employees and enter into 
appropriate recognition agreements with them.”2  Id. 
   
But Crozer also noted in that letter that certain things 
will change, including that “Prospect will assume [Crozer]’s 
outstanding pension liability, funding $100 million of the 
obligation at closing and providing distributions to pay all 
benefits owed to pension participants and beneficiaries within 
five years of the closing date.”  J.A. 60.  Attached to the letter 
was a list of Frequently Asked Questions, which included short 
explanations about how the Prospect sale would affect the 
terms and conditions of employment for unionized and non-
unionized employees, as well as the continued operation of the 
hospitals and union relations. 
 
Ten days after receiving a copy of the January 8 letter, 
the Union emailed Crozer, “requesting the complete Asset 
Purchase Agreement [(“APA”)] and all attachments and 
schedule[s] of the agreement.”  J.A. 67.  The Union wrote that 
“[u]pon receipt of the agreement we will review and you can 
 
2 The letter also stated that all of Crozer’s “hospitals will 
remain open”; “[c]ritical service lines such as [emergency 
department], trauma, burn, behavioral health, maternity, 
neonatal intensive care and pediatrics will stay in place or be 
expanded”; Crozer’s “charity care policies will be 
maintained”; and “wellness, health education, and other 




expect a request for effects bargaining shortly after.”  Id.  
Crozer responded that it was “unable to give [the Union] a copy 
of the APA at this time because it is confidential and 
proprietary.”  J.A. 69.  Crozer explained that the APA “is 
covered by the terms of a confidentiality agreement to which 
Crozer is subject” and that “the entire APA is not relevant for 
effects bargaining over the terms and conditions of 
employment of bargaining unit members.”  Id.  It told the 
Union that it was “open to considering any alternative requests 
[the Union] may have.”  Id.  
 
That was unacceptable to the Union, which wrote back: 
 
We were hoping to avoid involving the Labor 
Board in our request for the APA but we intend 
to file a charge if [the] Crozer Administration 
continues to refuse to provide the APA, including 
attachments and schedules.  If your email is 
intended as an offer to negotiate over 
confidentiality, the union is prepared to bargain 
over confidentiality, provided there is an 
understanding that the APA, with attachments 
and schedules, will be forthcoming.  
 
J.A. 70.  Crozer didn’t budge. 
  
Crozer and the Union broached the subject again when 
they met the next month for a bargaining session over a nursing 
unit at one of Crozer’s hospitals.3  There, the Union reiterated 
 
3 The Union had been recently certified as the 
bargaining representative for this unit of nurses, and this 
session was for initial bargaining. 
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its request for the APA.  Crozer again explained “that much of 
[the APA] was confidential and proprietary,” but “that [it] 
would be willing to determine what was relevant and share that 
with the Union.”  J.A. 253.  According to a Union official 
present at that bargaining session, Crozer never explained why 
the APA was confidential.  The two sides, at any rate, remained 
entrenched in their positions.  
 
The next day, Crozer sent the Union a more official 
response to its information request.  It wrote, among other 
things:   
 
[Crozer] objects to the request on the basis that it 
is premature, overbroad and seeks irrelevant 
information.  Indeed, as you know, the [Crozer] 
transaction with Prospect is contingent upon 
regulatory approval that has not yet occurred and 
as of this point, has not yet even been scheduled.  
Additionally, as you may be aware, [Crozer’s 
and the Union’s attorneys] recently discussed 
this request.  On behalf of [Crozer], [Crozer’s 
attorney] offered to discuss with [the Union] the 
potential for production of those portions of the 
[APA] and any attachments and schedules 
thereto that relate to or affect [Crozer] 
employees, including those who are members of 
[the Union].  [The Union’s attorney] refused this 
offer, stating that [the Union] wants everything.  
[The Union] offered nothing more to explain 
why the entire document is relevant or needed for 
it to fulfill its functions as bargaining 
representative for certain [Crozer] employees.  
We again renew that offer to discuss which 
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portions of the documents are relevant to [the 
Union’s] role as bargaining representative with 
respect to effects bargaining.  Please let me know 
if you would like to have further discussions on 
this issue. 
 
[Crozer] further objects to the request on the 
basis that it seeks confidential and proprietary 
information that is subject to legal prohibitions 
on disclosure.  As [Crozer’s attorney] explained 
to [the Union’s attorney], the entire [APA] is the 
subject of a confidentiality agreement between 
[Crozer] and Prospect that [Crozer] is legally 
obliged to follow.  Therefore, to the extent the 
parties were able to reach agreement on the 
production of any relevant portion of the 
Agreement, before [Crozer] can turn over 
anything contained in the Agreement, [the 
Union] must agree to the terms of a 
confidentiality agreement acceptable to [Crozer] 
and Prospect that adequately protects [Crozer’s] 
and Prospect’s confidential and proprietary 
interests in those portions of the [APA] to which 
[the Union] may be entitled. 
 
J.A. 72–73.  The Union did not respond.  Instead, four days 
later, it filed charges with the Board. 
 
Two other unions soon requested from Crozer “sections 
of the APA that say what Prospect is going to assume and not 
assume relative to employees.”  J.A. 74.  In response to those 
requests, Crozer’s General Counsel advised Crozer’s Vice 
President of Human Resources, Elizabeth Bilotta, that Crozer 
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“should provide relevant redacted excerpts from the APA” to 
those two unions, noting that “[t]hat is essentially what [it] 
previously offered to [the Union] as a compromise.”  Id.4  
  
Although Crozer still had provided no parts of the APA 
to the Union, the two sides proceeded to engage in effects 
bargaining over the Prospect sale in late May and early June 
2016. 
 
As part of the sale process, Crozer filed a petition in the 
Delaware County Court of Common Pleas to obtain approval 
of the sale.5  Because that petition included the body of the 
APA, the Union obtained a copy from the Pennsylvania 
Attorney General’s Office on June 6, 2016.  Crozer’s filings 
with the Court of Common Pleas, however, did not include the 
APA’s attachments or schedules.  At the request of the Attorney 
General, Crozer provided the Union on June 22 with copies of 
schedules 4.13(a) (“Employee Benefit Plans”) and 4.18(a) 
(“Labor, Unions, Collective Bargaining Agreements”), but no 





4 According to Bilotta, Crozer drafted a confidentiality 
agreement for those two unions, but it ultimately never needed 
to use it (or provide those two unions with redacted copies of 
the APA) because, as we will explain, the APA, minus the 
attachments and schedules, soon became public as part of a 
court petition. 
5 The Court of Common Pleas eventually approved the 
Prospect sale, which was finalized on July 1, 2016. 
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In December 2016, an Administrative Law Judge 
(“ALJ”) held a trial on the charges the Union filed against 
Crozer.  Considering the demeanor of the witnesses, other 
evidence, and briefing, the ALJ ultimately concluded, in a 
written opinion, that Crozer had “violated Section 8(a)(5) and 
(1) of the [NLRA] by failing and refusing to provide the [APA], 
including all attachments and schedules, that was requested by 
the [Union].”  J.A. 15.  The ALJ explained that “it was clear to 
both parties that the APA contained relevant information and 
needed to be produced in whole or in part.”  J.A. 13.  In 
addition, the ALJ observed that “the record contains no 
explanation why either Crozer or Prospect actually believed 
that certain portions of the APA were confidential or 
proprietary,” and that Crozer had thus “failed to meet [its] 
burden of proving a valid confidentiality interest in the APA.”  
J.A. 14.   
 
As a remedy, the ALJ ordered Crozer “to produce to the 
Union the entire APA with all attachments and schedules.”  J.A. 
15.  The ALJ explained that Crozer is “not now entitled to a 
second chance to assert objections to production that should 
have been raised in a timely manner when the request was 
initially made over a year ago.  To do so would place [Crozer] 
in a more advantageous position than [it is in] now.”  Id. 
 
A panel of the Board adopted the ALJ’s order by a vote 
of 2-1.  The Board explained that Crozer never “substantiated 
[its] asserted confidentiality interest.”  J.A. 6 n.2.  In the 
Board’s view, Crozer also did not “engage in accommodative 
bargaining at the time [it] first asserted a confidentiality 
interest,” and thus had “unfairly imposed, and unjustly reaped 
the benefit of, an additional year of delay upon an uninformed 




One Board Member dissented in part.  He agreed that 
Crozer violated the NLRA by not providing the parts of the 
APA “that were non-confidential and relevant for purposes of 
effects bargaining.”  J.A. 7.  But he believed the Board’s 
remedy –– ordering production of the entire APA, including all 
schedules and attachments –– was impermissibly punitive.  He 
explained that Crozer has “legitimate confidentiality interests 
that deserve protection, and the Union had no right to insist on 
the blanket disclosure of these documents.”  Id.  Accordingly, 
he would have ordered Crozer just to “provid[e] such relevant 
and non-confidential portions of the APA to the Union and 
engag[e] in accommodative bargaining over the remaining 
confidential relevant portions.”  Id. 
 
Crozer timely petitioned for review, and the Board 




We have jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and (f), 
and the Board had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).  In 
reviewing the Board’s decision,6 we accept as conclusive its 
 
6 “Where the Board adopts the ALJ’s findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, it is the ALJ’s determinations that we 
review.”  Trafford Distrib. Ctr. v. NLRB, 478 F.3d 172, 179 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (quoting SCA Tissue N. Am. LLC v. NLRB, 371 
F.3d 983, 988 (7th Cir. 2004)).  But “[w]here the Board has 
adopted the ALJ’s decision in part, the Court reviews both.”  
Id.  Here, the Board generally “affirm[ed] the [ALJ’s] rulings, 
findings, and conclusions,” and adopted its recommended 
Order.  J.A. 6.  But it also provided additional discussion of its 
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factual findings if they are “supported by substantial evidence 
given the record as a whole” and determine whether the 
decision “is in accordance with applicable law.”  Hertz Corp. 
v. NLRB, 105 F.3d 868, 872–73 (3d Cir. 1997).  If the Board’s 
“construction of the [NLRA] is reasonably defensible, it should 
not be rejected merely because [we] might prefer another view 
of the statute.”  Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 
(1979).  “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.  It 
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Consol. Edison 
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).  And the Board’s 
remedial authority “is a broad discretionary one, subject to 
limited judicial review.”  Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. 




Crozer argues that the Board erred in finding that it had 
violated the NLRA.  We hold that, despite Crozer’s protests, 
substantial evidence did support the Board’s finding that the 
Union sufficiently established the relevance of at least part of 
the APA and that Crozer did not establish any confidentiality 
interest in it.  Substantial evidence thus supports the Board’s 
conclusion that Crozer, by failing to provide those relevant 
parts to the Union, violated the NLRA.  But we also hold that 
the Board, in ordering Crozer to disclose the entire APA, which 
included information never established as relevant, abused its 




own.  We therefore review both the Board and the ALJ 






 The NLRA prohibits employers from refusing to 
bargain in good faith with unions representing their employees 
regarding “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.”  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d).  While an employer 
has no duty to bargain about its decision to sell its business, an 
employer is obligated to bargain with a union over the effects 
of such a sale because “the effects of that sale are considered 
‘conditions of employment’ within the meaning of” § 158(d).  
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Sawyer, 517 F.3d 785, 793 
(5th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted); see also First Nat’l 
Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981); NLRB v. 
Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 
1965).  An employer’s “refus[al] to bargain collectively with 
the representatives of [its] employees” constitutes an unfair 
labor practice under NLRA section 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(5).  Violation of NLRA section 8(a)(5) also results in a 
derivative violation of section 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), 
which provides that employers who “interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in the exercise of the[ir] rights guaranteed” 
by the NLRA have committed an unfair labor practice, id.; see 
N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 720 F.2d 789, 791 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1983); cf. Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 698 n.4 
(1983) (“Although §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) are not coterminous, 
a violation of § 8(a)(3) constitutes a derivative violation of § 
8(a)(1).”). 
 The duty to bargain in good faith includes “the general 
obligation of an employer to provide information that is needed 
by the bargaining representative for the proper performance of 
its duties.”  NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–36 
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(1967).  This obligation promotes intelligent and informed 
representation of union members.  
  
 The threshold question is whether the requested 
information is relevant to fulfilling the Union’s bargaining 
duties.  We have determined that “if the requested data is 
relevant and, therefore reasonably necessary, to a union’s role 
as bargaining agent,” then an employer’s failure to furnish this 
information constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 
8(a)(5).  Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 68 (3d 
Cir. 1965); see Hertz, 105 F.3d at 873.7  Courts and the Board 
employ a liberal and broad “discovery-type standard” in 
assessing relevance in the labor context.  Acme Indus., 385 
U.S. at 437.  Accordingly, the burden of showing relevance is 
light and requires only “the ‘probability that the desired 
information [is] relevant.’”  Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers 
Local Union No. 6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 359 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (alteration in original) (quoting Acme Indus., 385 U.S. 
at 437); see Country Ford Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 229 F.3d 
1184, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he threshold for relevance is 
low.”).  This undemanding standard of relevance is necessary 
because “[u]nless each side has access to information enabling 
it to discuss intelligently and deal meaningfully with 
bargainable issues, effective negotiation cannot occur.”  Local 
13, Detroit Newspaper Printing & Graphic Commc’ns Union 
 
7 We note that relevant information must be produced 
unless, as the Board points out, the employer can demonstrate 
a “legitimate and substantial countervailing” interest, such as 
that confidentiality may be compromised by the employer’s 
disclosure.  Board Br. 22.  Crozer’s challenge to the Board’s 




v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing Curtiss-
Wright, 347 F.2d at 68); see NLRB v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas 
Co., 157 F.3d 222, 230 (3d Cir. 1998).  The relevance standard 
is not unlimited, however, as it safeguards against unfounded 
“fishing expeditions” by parties.8  See Detroit Edison Co. v. 
NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 318 (1979) (declining to endorse “the 
proposition that union interests in arguably relevant 
information must always predominate over all other interests, 
however, legitimate”).  Determinations of relevance are made 
by considering the facts and circumstances present in 
individual cases.  See Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 711 F.2d 








 We hold that substantial evidence in the record supports 
the ALJ’s finding that the APA contained relevant information 
 
8 We emphasize that nothing in this opinion should be 
construed as encouraging unions to make overbroad 
information requests hoping for a kernel of relevant 
information or, as Crozer fears, as endorsing a rule that an 
employer “will be punished unless it capitulates entirely.”  
Crozer Br. 3.  In this regard, we agree that “just as there are 
some limits as to what is discoverable information under the 
[Federal] Rules of Civil Procedure, there are similar limits to 
discoverable information in the collective-bargaining context.  
These limits are not stringent, however.”  NLRB v. George 
Koch Sons, Inc., 950 F.2d 1324, 1332 (7th Cir. 1991).    
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for the Union’s effects bargaining.  The ALJ, in fact, found that 
Crozer admitted that parts of the APA were relevant, and this 
finding was also supported by substantial evidence.  For 
instance, Crozer’s initial response to the Union’s request was 
that “the entire APA is not relevant for effects bargaining” — 
not denying partial relevance and essentially acknowledging 
that some of the APA is relevant.  J.A. 69.  In addition, when 
other unions requested copies of the APA, Crozer’s General 
Counsel wrote:  “I believe we should provide relevant redacted 
excerpts from the APA to [the other unions].  That is essentially 
what we previously offered to [the Union] as a compromise.”  
J.A. 74 (emphasis added).9  As the ALJ observed, Crozer 
proffered no explanation as to why that redacted version was 
not provided to the Union.  And if the concession of relevance 
by Crozer was not clear, at the trial before the ALJ, Crozer’s 
sole witness (Bilotta) explicitly made this admission in her 
testimony.  See J.A. 308 (“Q[:]  You’re aware that some items 
in the APA are relevant to bargaining unit employees at 
[Crozer], correct?  A[:] Yes.”); see also J.A. 309 (“Q[:] . . . 
[W]ould items in an APA be relevant to contract negotiations?  
A[:] Yes, generally, yes.”). 
 
The ALJ specifically found relevant provisions 
pertaining to “employees’ terms and conditions of 
employment, the name of the hospitals, the continuation or 
expansion of certain service lines, capital investments, 
standards of care, equipment and property.”  J.A. 13.  The ALJ 
 
9 Crozer argues that its preparation of a redacted copy 
of the APA for other unions should be understood as a 
compromise, not a concession of relevance.  But Crozer 
glosses over the statement of its own internal counsel that the 
APA contained relevant parts. 
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explained that this information, at a minimum, “would be 
relevant to the availability and location of unit work, the 
potential for layoffs and hiring, whether the pension plan 
would be fully funded, and whether non-unit employees were 
receiving pay or benefits the Union might want to negotiate 
(for parity) on behalf of unit employees.”  Id.  It was thus clear 
to both Crozer and the Union that the APA contained relevant 
information directly bearing on the terms and conditions of 
unionized employees.  See Compact Video Servs., Inc., 319 
N.L.R.B. 131, 144 (1995) (acknowledging the “legal realit[y]” 
that a selling employer “must bargain about the effects of . . . a 
decision [to sell] on unit employees, and as an incident thereto, 
it must normally give the union access, upon request, to the 
sale agreement and more generally, to ‘information concerning 
the sale’”), enforced, 121 F.3d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(enforcing the Board’s order “to provide [a] [u]nion with 
contracts relating to the acquisition and takeover”).  Under the 
expansive standard for relevance and according proper 
deference to the Board’s finding of relevance, we perceive no 
reason to upset the Board’s determination that parts of the APA 
were relevant.  See NLRB v. Compact Video Servs., Inc., 121 
F.3d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting “the great weight we 
must give the Board’s finding that the information in the sales 
contract is relevant”); NLRB v. New Eng. Newspapers, Inc., 
856 F.2d 409, 414 (1st Cir. 1988) (“[T]he Board’s 





 Crozer’s main argument is narrow:  that it had no 
obligation to furnish the APA or any part of it to the Union 
because the Union did not specify its relevance to Crozer.  We 
18 
 
disagree and determine that Crozer had a duty to furnish at least 




Allocation of the burden to demonstrate relevance 
depends upon the type of information that a union requests.  As 
we have held, “wage and related information pertaining to 
employees in the bargaining unit is presumptively relevant.”  
Curtiss-Wright, 347 F.2d at 69; see U.S. Testing Co. v. NLRB, 
160 F.3d 14, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“For information about 
employees in the bargaining unit, it is presumed that the 
requested information is relevant to the union’s negotiations.”).  
Unions thus are not required to demonstrate the precise 
relevance of requested information that is presumptively 
relevant as such information “concerns the core of the 
employer-employee relationship,” unless an employer is able 
to rebut its relevance.  Curtiss-Wright, 347 F.2d at 69.  This 
rule regarding presumptively relevant materials “avoids 
potentially endless bickering between management and the 
union over the specific relevance of information, the very 
nature of which ought to render its relevance obvious.”  
Emeryville Rsch. Ctr. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 887 (9th Cir. 
1971); see Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 711 F.2d at 359 
(“[A] presumption of relevance, of course, may substantially 
simplify the assessment of a union’s request for information.”).  
However, requests for other information, such as information 
pertaining to non-bargaining unit employees, do not implicate 
a presumption of relevance, and “a union must, by reference to 
the circumstances of the case, as an initial matter, demonstrate 
more precisely the relevance of the data it desires.”  Curtiss-
Wright, 347 F.2d at 69; see U.S. Postal Serv. v. NLRB, 18 F.3d 
1089, 1101 (3d Cir. 1994).  The same liberal standard of 
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relevancy applies, regardless of whether the request for 
information is subject to the presumption of relevance.  
Curtiss-Wright, 347 F.2d at 69. 
 
The ALJ began its analysis by discussing presumptive 
relevance.  Referencing Crozer’s January 8 letter “that the 
APA contained information about how the operation would 
change and not change under new management with regard to 
such things as [, inter alia,] employees’ terms and conditions 
of employment,” the ALJ ultimately found that “[s]ome of this 
information would be presumptively relevant.”  J.A. 13; see 
U.S. Postal Serv., 18 F.3d at 1100–01 (noting that 
presumptively relevant information includes “[i]nformation 
about the terms and conditions of employment” and “is 
required to be produced”).  Substantial evidence in the record 
supports this finding.  Crozer informed the Union (and 
Crozer’s work force) that the APA covered multiple items 
bearing upon terms and conditions of employment, including 
offers of employment for unionized employees and the status 
of several service lines and hospitals.  J.A. 59–60.  The Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit, in fact, has ruled that an 
employer must provide a union with its contract of sale because 
the contract of sale “concern[ed] a condition of employment, 
[and] . . . it is presumptively relevant and must be disclosed 
unless it plainly appears irrelevant.”  New Eng. Newspapers, 
856 F.2d at 413 (quotation marks omitted).  As a result, 
substantial evidence supports the finding that at least some of 
the information in the APA was presumptively relevant, and 
Crozer did not rebut its relevance.10  
 
10 We note, however, that the ALJ was unclear 





Even if the Union was not entitled to this presumption 
regarding the relevant evidence in the APA, any specificity 
lacking in its request for the APA would not change the result 
given the circumstances of this case.  Crozer asserts that it did 
not “understand [the Union’s] asserted need for the Purchase 
Agreement,” Crozer Reply Br. 8, and contends that the Union 
did not meet a standard set forth in our decision in Hertz Corp. 
v. NLRB that a union requesting information pertaining to non-
members of a bargaining unit has a “minimal obligation” to 
advise the employer of the factual basis for its request, 105 
F.3d at 874.11   
 
But the Hertz decision also provides that in some cases, 
a union’s reason “will be readily apparent,” and “[w]hen it is 
clear that the employer should have known the reason for the 
union’s request for information, a specific communication of 
the facts underlying the request may be unnecessary.”  Id.  This 
is such a case and, hence, Hertz does not absolve Crozer of its 
obligation to provide relevant parts of the APA to the Union.  
 
11 The Board has observed that Hertz creates a “more 
demanding standard” than it recognizes.  H&R Indus. Servs., 
Inc., 351 N.L.R.B. 1222, 1224 (2007).  We do not here intend 
to expand this obligation.  Moreover, insofar as Hertz involved 
a different context — an investigation of discrimination — the 
standard we enunciated was tied to that context:  the union 
“needed only to communicate some reasonable basis for its 
suspicion that the employer might be engaging in 
discrimination.”  105 F.3d at 874.  Perhaps this is why the 
Union, appearing in this case as an intervenor, did not refer to 
Hertz in its brief.  However, we will assume without deciding 




Our determination is compelled by analysis of the 
context of the Union’s request as well as the facts and 
circumstances present.  See Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. at 153; 
Curtiss-Wright, 347 F.2d at 69.  The Union was advised in 
Crozer’s January 8 letter that the APA had been finalized and 
that the final step — regulatory approval of the sale — would 
“take several months.”  J.A. 60.  This meant that the Union 
would need to move quickly to bargain, and as we have noted:  
  
[d]uring a transition period between employers, 
a union is in a peculiarly vulnerable position.  It 
has no formal and established bargaining 
relationship with the new employer [and] is 
uncertain about the new employer’s plans . . . .  
While being concerned with the future of its 
members with the new employer, the union also 
must protect whatever rights still exist for its 
members under the collective-bargaining 
agreement with the predecessor employer. 
 
Grane Health Care v. NLRB, 712 F.3d 145, 153 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(first alteration in original) (quoting Fall River Dyeing & 
Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 39 (1987)). 
 
 The Union requested a single document from Crozer to 
prepare for and conduct effects bargaining:  the APA.  See J.A. 
13–14 n.8 (ALJ noting “that the Union indicated a desire to 
obtain the APA with all attachments and schedules for use in 
bargaining over the effects of the sale”); see also Crozer Reply 
Br. 12 (“[T]he right to effects bargaining [is] virtually always 
triggered by the sale of a business.”).  A sales agreement such 
as the APA is what the Board has acknowledged to be “the 
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single, most authoritative and reliable source of data which 
would have formed the underpinnings of effects bargaining.”  
New Eng. Newspapers, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 124, 128 (1987), 
enforced, 856 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1988).  The Crozer point 
person for responding to the Union’s request — Bilotta, 
Crozer’s vice president of human resources — testified before 
the ALJ that she had in excess of thirty-five years of 
experience.  See J.A. 13 (ALJ finding that Bilotta “has 
extensive experience dealing with information requests”).  
Bilotta candidly agreed that generally, the contents of an APA 
would be relevant to bargaining, J.A. 309 (“Q[:] . . . [W]ould 
items in an APA be relevant to contract negotiations?  A[:] Yes, 
generally, yes.”), and, as discussed earlier, she admitted that 
parts of this particular APA would be relevant to the Union.  
Ultimately, the ALJ found that “experienced bargaining 
parties, such as these, could reasonably expect the Union to use 
[the APA] in connection with [the] upcoming contract 
negotiations.”  J.A. 13–14 n.8.12  Hence, the Hertz standard is 
 
12 It is hardly unusual for unions to request (and receive) 
sales agreements, and other decisions have required sales 
agreements and similar documents to be produced when 
requested by unions representing sellers’ employees in various 
circumstances.  See, e.g., Supervalu, Inc. v. NLRB, 184 F.3d 
949, 951–53 (8th Cir. 1999); Compact Video Servs., 121 F.3d 
at 483; Providence Hosp. v. NLRB, 93 F.3d 1012, 1018–20 
(1st Cir. 1996); Mary Thompson Hosp. v. NLRB, 943 F.2d 
741, 746–47 (7th Cir. 1991); New Eng. Newspapers, 856 F.2d 
at 413–14; Sierra Int’l Trucks, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 948, 950–51 
(1995); St. Marys Foundry, 284 N.L.R.B. 221, 233 (1987), 
enforced, 860 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1988); J.A. 13 (ALJ decision 
acknowledging that “[i]n prior cases, the Board has ordered 
production of sales agreements for the purchase of employers 
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met because Crozer “should have known the reason for the 
union’s request for [the APA].”  105 F.3d at 874. 
 
Other facts and circumstances unique to this case 
support our conclusion.  In its January 8 letter, Crozer advised 
the Union as well as its employees and physicians that under 
the APA, important operations and conditions would and 
would not change and informed them about particular items of 
interest that would impact them.  Items chosen by Crozer to 
mention in its letter included hiring of union workers with 
“initial terms set by [the new employer],” hiring non-union 
employees, continuation of certain service lines, employee 
pension liability, impacts of becoming a for-profit hospital, and 
the duration of existing health and welfare benefits.  J.A. 59–
66; see also J.A. 61–63 (providing, in January 8 letter, 
“Frequently Asked Questions” regarding “Definitive 
Agreement with Prospect,” such as “What does this mean for 
unionized Crozer-Keystone employees?,” “Will Crozer-
Keystone employees receive the same benefits?,” and “What 
will happen to labor union relations under Prospect?”); J.A. 
95–97 (listing APA schedules such as “Closed Hospital 
Departments,” “Crozer Retention Bonuses,” “Crozer Pension 
Plan Actuarial Assumptions, Terms, and Conditions,” 
“[Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN)] 
Act,” and “Crozer Pension Contributions Schedule”).  
Accordingly, Crozer should have known the reason why the 
Union would request the APA that contained the items it had 
broadcasted to the Union and its work force. 
   
 
where the agreements were requested by unions that 
represented employees employed by the seller”). 
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The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s decision in 
Western Massachusetts Electric Co. v. NLRB, 573 F.2d 101 
(1st Cir. 1978), is instructive.  In that case, the employer 
contended that “the union never made clear the reasons why it 
wanted [certain] cost information.”  Id. at 107.  But the court 
noted that the employer had “put costs in[to] contention” 
through assertions it had made to the union.  Id.  The court 
concluded that the information should be produced, and 
addressing the employer’s assertion, determined that in light of 
the employer’s representations, the employer “appear[ed] to 
have had a sufficient basis for understanding the purpose of the 
union’s request.”  Id.  The First Circuit’s decision is not an 
outlier.  See U.S. Testing, 160 F.3d at 19–20 (rejecting 
employer’s contention that it had insufficient notice regarding 
the potential relevance of a union request for individual 
insurance claims information because “context is everything,” 
and the employer “put on the table” the concern of growing 
health care costs); Providence Hosp., 93 F.3d at 1019–20 
(holding that where, inter alia, the employer distributed written 
information about a merger, including some workplace 
changes such as “broad hints that it already had formulated 
some ideas relative to future staffing of the new system” and 
its expected regulatory approval, “[u]nder the totality of the 
circumstances that existed here—especially the employer’s 
expressed confidence that the merger would take place soon 
and the emphasis in its handouts on the reallocation of 
personnel,” substantial evidence supported the Board’s order 
requiring disclosure of merger-related documents); Caldwell 
Mfg. Co., 346 N.L.R.B. 1159, 1160 (2006) (ruling that an 
employer “made the information relevant and created the 
obligation to provide the requested data” because of the 
employer’s factual assertions to the union).  Because Crozer 
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chose to put items in the APA in play, it is “readily apparent” 
why the Union would request the APA.  Hertz, 105 F.3d at 874. 
       
Relatedly, the Union was entitled to verify or 
substantiate the representations that Crozer made to the 
employees in the January 8 letter.  See Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. at 
152–53 (determining that an employer committed an unfair 
labor practice when it refused a union request to substantiate a 
claim that it could not pay higher wages); E.I. DuPont de 
Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 489 F.3d 1310, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (holding “that a union is entitled to inspect the data relied 
on by an employer and does not have to accept the employer’s 
bald assertions or generalized figures at face value”); W. Mass. 
Elec. Co., 573 F.2d at 107 (acknowledging that when an 
employer makes “assertions, the duty to bargain in good faith 
required [the employer] to provide, upon demand, such 
information as was reasonably necessary to substantiate 
them”); see also Mary Thompson Hosp., 943 F.2d at 747 
(holding that a union was entitled to a sales and transfer 
agreement “in order to verify the data it obtained through 
alternative sources”).  The failure of Crozer to furnish any part 
of the APA to the Union made such verification and 
substantiation impossible.  See J.A. 295 (Bilotta testimony 
acknowledging the frustration of the union representative at 
bargaining and the representative’s feeling that “we were in the 
light and they were in the dark” without the APA).  We agree 
with the ALJ’s conclusion that “the Union was entitled to the 
actual document to verify the summary [in the January 8 letter] 
and to obtain additional details.”  J.A. 13. 
 
In sum, it is clear that Crozer should have known the 
reason for the Union’s request for the APA.  The ALJ found 
that “it was clear to both parties that the APA contained 
26 
 
relevant information.”  Id.  It was unnecessary, therefore, for 
the Union to communicate specific facts underlying the 
request.  Hertz, 105 F.3d at 874.13  We emphasize that meeting 
the standard set forth in Hertz depends upon the circumstances 
of each case and caution that a union’s mere invocation of the 
necessity of a sales agreement for bargaining in the context of 




 We turn to the employer’s obligation to produce 
relevant information.  Notwithstanding the relevance of at least 
some of the APA, Crozer failed to furnish the Union with any 
part of it.  This failure was the basis of the Board’s ultimate 
conclusion that Crozer violated section 8(a)(5) and (1).  We 
agree.  
 
 The employer must disclose relevant parts of a 
document in response to a union request.  This disclosure duty 
exists even if other parts of a document are not subject to 
production.  See Country Ford Trucks, 229 F.3d at 1192 
(determining that even if “the Union’s request was overbroad, 
 
13 In addition, in the context of this case, the Union 
could not be blamed for not providing more specificity 
regarding which parts of the APA it desired as it had no idea of 
the APA’s contents, save a few summarized aspects in 
Crozer’s January 8 letter.  See Olean Gen. Hosp., 363 N.L.R.B. 
No. 62, slip op. at 10 (Dec. 11, 2015) (rejecting an employer’s 
claim that the Union failed to show a “specific need” for a 
requested report and holding that “[t]he inability to identify 
specific relevant information in the report can hardly be held 
against the Union, which has never seen the report”). 
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this does not excuse the [employer] from providing the 
requested information to which the Union had an undisputed 
right”); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, 711 F.3d at 361 
(“[T]he mere fact that a Union’s request encompasses 
information which the employer is not legally obligated to 
provide does not automatically excuse him from complying 
with the Union’s request to the extent that it also encompasses 
information which he would be required to provide if it were 
the sole subject of the demand.” (quoting Fawcett Printing 
Corp., 201 N.L.R.B. 964, 975 (1973))); id. at 362 (noting that 
a claim that some requested information encompassed trade 
secrets “could not justify the companies’ total noncompliance 
with the unions’ requests”).14  The ALJ was correct in holding 
that the APA contained relevant information and that it 
“needed to be produced” at least “in part.”  J.A. 13.  
 
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “frequently” 
provide useful “guidance” to the Board.  NLRB Div. of Judges, 
Bench Book i (2019); cf. NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 
187 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1951) (“The rule governing 
disclosure of data [to a union] is not unlike that prevailing in 
discovery procedures under modern codes.”).  The discovery 
standards set forth in the Rules and the decisions that apply 
them lend support to our analysis. 
   
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(C) provides 
that a party may object to a document request, but “must 
specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.”  The 
advisory committee note explains that the rule “make[s] clear 
 
14 Application of the disclosure principles discussed 
herein depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.  
See Truitt Mfg., 351 U.S. at 153. 
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that, if a request for production is objectionable only in part, 
production should be afforded with respect to the 
unobjectionable portions.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory 
committee’s note to 1993 amendment; see Bogosian v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Of course, where 
the same document contains both facts and [privileged 
material], the adversary party is entitled to discovery of the 
facts.”); Breon v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 232 F.R.D. 49, 55 
(D. Conn. 2005) (“It is not proper to withhold an entire 
document from discovery on grounds that a portion of it may 
be privileged.”).15  So, as in a civil lawsuit, an employer facing 
a request for documents must furnish the union with the 
relevant material upon demand, even if other material covered 
by the demand is not subject to production.  The ALJ correctly 
held that Crozer violated this obligation given the facts and 
circumstances in this case. 
 
 In addition, the ALJ held that Crozer “failed to indicate 
what portions [of the APA it] deemed irrelevant and 
confidential, or explain why.”  J.A. 13.  Substantial evidence 
supports this determination, and, indeed, the Board has applied 
its “straightforward” standard that an employer responding to 
a union information request has a duty “to adequately explain 
 
15 We have applied similar rules of production in the 
Freedom of Information Act context.  For instance, we have 
determined that “‘[a]n agency cannot justify withholding an 
entire document simply by showing it contains some exempt 
material,’” and, instead, “the agency must demonstrate that all 
reasonably segregable, nonexempt information was released.”  
Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 186 
(3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1977)). 
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why [unproduced] information will not be furnished.”  
Regency Serv. Carts, Inc., 345 N.L.R.B. 671, 673 (2005); see 
also Board Br. 41 (arguing that “[a]ll Crozer needed to do was 
‘at any time, sen[d] an email to the Union with a redacted 
version of the APA, including the list of schedules . . . and an 
explanation as to why certain information was being 
withheld’” (quoting J.A. 38)); Oral Arg. Tr. 24:18–21 (Board 
arguing that “it’s not an overwhelming obligation” because 
“[a]ll [Crozer had] to do [was] . . .  identify what [it was] not 
providing, and explain why”).  We note that the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure are in accord.  Rule 34 provides that a 
responding party has the obligation to “state whether any 
responsive materials are being withheld” and state the reason 
or reasons why.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C).  See Smash Tech., 
LLC v. Smash Sols., LLC, --- F.R.D. ---, 2020 WL 3546254, 
at *5 (D. Utah June 30, 2020) (citing Rule 34(b)(2)(C) and 
observing that a responding party “must state whether 
responsive materials were withheld and link each specific 
objection to what was withheld”).  This explanation by the 
responding party should provide enough detail to “facilitate an 
informed discussion” about why the material was withheld.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2015 
amendment.  
  
The ALJ noted that Crozer should have produced 
relevant parts of the APA “along with an explanation of what 
they were withholding so the parties could engage in 
meaningful discussions about the proper scope of production.”  
J.A. 14; see J.A. 13 n.8 (ALJ observing that Crozer was “best 
situated to initiate a discussion of [what would be withheld] 
because they were in possession of the information”).  
Although Crozer did eventually assert a boilerplate objection 
that the Union request for the entire APA sought “irrelevant 
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information” and was premature and overbroad, J.A. 72, 
Crozer never specified which parts of the APA this objection 
pertained to or why and, of course, it withheld everything.  
Accordingly, Crozer failed to meet its production obligations 
in the circumstances of this case.   
 
 The above-described disclosure obligation — 
furnishing relevant parts of a document to the requesting party 
and identifying what has been withheld and the reasons why 
— was not foreign to Crozer.  Indeed, at the trial before the 
ALJ, Crozer’s sole witness (Bilotta) testified about what she 
does when she receives a request for information from a union 
— a “pretty frequent” occurrence.  J.A. 290.  For instance, 
Bilotta testified that when a union requests information, “I’ll 
provide all of the information that is relevant and I’ll [include] 
in my response as to what I’m not providing and why . . . and 
that we’re willing to continue discussions about it.”  J.A. 291.  
Considering this testimony about Bilotta’s “standard operating 
procedure,” the ALJ noted that “it is unclear why she did not 
follow it with regard to the APA.”  J.A. 13.  This failure is 
especially curious given that Crozer supplied nothing to the 
Union but gave parts of the APA to other unions and that 
Crozer made public the APA (without schedules or 
attachments) through its June 3, 2016 filing in the Delaware 
County Court of Common Pleas, although the Union only first 
saw the APA when it was provided by the Pennsylvania 
Attorney General’s Office on June 6, 2016.   
  
    
 Crozer strenuously complains that the Union failed “to 
meet it halfway,” Crozer Br. 1, and was “stonewalling,” Crozer 
Reply Br. 21, by refusing to recede from its request for the 
entire APA.  The Union certainly could have been more 
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communicative, and we cannot say that its conduct was 
exemplary.  But this does not absolve Crozer of its production 
obligations.  The ALJ correctly determined that Crozer could 
not avoid or delay meeting its obligation to produce relevant 
portions of the APA through, for instance, seeking alternative 
requests.  See U.S. Testing, 160 F.3d at 21 (noting that “the 
onus is on the employer because it is in the better position to 
propose how best it can respond to a union request for 
information,” and that “[t]he union need not propose the 
precise alternative to providing the information unedited”).  In 
particular, as the ALJ recognized, Crozer was “not entitled to 
withhold information [it] already had an obligation to provide 
as leverage in asking the Union to accept less than it may 
otherwise be entitled to receive.”  J.A. 14.  This is tantamount 
to a responding party holding “hostage” information that it 
should have produced until the requestor capitulates to the 
responding party’s demands for concessions — a type of 
gamesmanship that will not promote justice in the labor or any 
civil context.  Further, we agree with the ALJ that because of 
Crozer’s failure to comply with its production obligations, “the 
Union was not put to the test of altering its position.”  Id.  
         
*    *    *    *    * 
 
Crozer’s failure to disclose relevant information from 
the APA to the Union “does not facilitate effective collective 
bargaining and, therefore, does not meet the requirements of 
Section 8(a)(1) and (5).”  Curtiss-Wright, 347 F.2d at 68.  We 
will enforce the Board’s order and deny Crozer’s petition 






Crozer next argues that, putting relevance aside, it did 
not have to provide the Union with the APA because it was 
confidential.  This argument also cannot withstand scrutiny. 
 
When a union requests relevant, yet confidential 
information, “the Board is required to balance a union’s need 
for the information against any ‘legitimate and substantial’ 
confidentiality interests established by the employer.”  Resorts 
Int’l Hotel Casino v. NLRB, 996 F.2d 1553, 1556 (3d Cir. 
1993) (quoting Pa. Power & Light Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 1104, 
1105 (1991)); see Detroit Edison, 440 U.S. at 318–20.  But 
importantly, “[b]efore such a balancing takes place, the party 
seeking to withhold relevant information on the basis of 
confidentiality bears the burden of demonstrating a legitimate 
claim of confidentiality.”  Resorts Int’l, 996 F.2d at 1556.  And 
“an employer cannot prevent production of [relevant] 
information simply by asserting that it is ‘confidential.’”  Nat’l 
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 324 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir. 2003); see 
NLRB v. Pfizer, Inc., 763 F.2d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(rejecting the notion that “an employer’s bare assertion that the 
information sought is confidential entitle[s] it to resist 
production with impunity”).  Further, the employer “must offer 
to accommodate both its concern and its bargaining 
obligations, as is often done by making an offer to release 
information conditionally or by placing restrictions on the use 
of that information.”  U.S. Testing, 160 F.3d at 20.  
 
 Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that 
Crozer failed to meet its “burden of proving a valid 
confidentiality interest in the APA.”  J.A. 14.  The record 
reveals that Crozer’s asserted confidentiality interest in the 
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APA stemmed from the agreement’s confidentiality provision.  
That is, Crozer’s concern was that providing the Union with a 
copy of the APA simply would violate the agreement’s clause 
that generally prohibits disclosure of the agreement to third 
parties.  As Crozer itself put it in an email to the Union:  
 
[Crozer] further objects to the request on the 
basis that it seeks confidential and proprietary 
information that is subject to legal prohibitions 
on disclosure. As [Crozer’s attorney] explained 
to [the Union’s attorney], the entire [APA] is the 
subject of a confidentiality agreement between 
[Crozer] and Prospect that [Crozer] is legally 
obliged to follow.  
 
J.A. 73.  Crozer’s concern was thus a technical one.  At no point 
did Crozer ever assert that certain parts of the APA were 
inherently sensitive.  J.A. 14 (ALJ finding that Crozer “never 
identified portions of the APA [it] wanted to keep confidential 
from the Union”).16  At most it said that the APA was 
 
16 Crozer argues that it is “beyond dispute” that it “has 
a cognizable confidentiality interest in the kind of business and 
financial information contained in the Purchase Agreement.”  
Crozer Br. 32.  But nearly all the cases Crozer cites for that 
proposition have to do with relevance, not confidentiality.  See, 
e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 4, 9 (1st Cir. 1977) 
(“Financial data need not be disclosed in the course of contract 
negotiations unless the bargaining representative first makes a 
showing that it is specially relevant to the bargaining taking 
place.”).  More to the point, Crozer, in all of its 
communications with the Union, never invoked “business and 
financial information contained in the Purchase Agreement” as 
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“confidential and proprietary,” J.A. 69, but such a naked 
assertion of confidentiality is insufficient to meet Crozer’s 
burden, J.A. 14 (ALJ noting that “the record contains no 
explanation why [Crozer] actually believed that certain 
portions of the APA were confidential or proprietary”).  See 
Nat’l Steel Corp., 324 F.3d at 934. 
 
 We agree with the ALJ that the APA’s confidentiality 
provision, on its own, did not suffice to create a legitimate and 
substantial confidentiality interest.  A confidentiality 
agreement, like the one here, is ultimately just a contract.  Any 
two parties can agree to keep certain matters secret, but that 
does not mean that those matters are inherently sensitive.17  See 
Wash. Star Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 391, 397 (1984) (rejecting a 
confidentiality argument and holding that a selling employer’s 
“obligation to provide the sales agreement [cannot] be defeated 
by a private agreement between [the employer] and [the 
buyer]”).  Indeed, as Crozer itself acknowledges, 
confidentiality provisions in sales agreements are often just 
boilerplate.  Crozer Br. 32.  Crozer does not provide, nor can 
we locate, any authority permitting an employer to withhold 
relevant information from a union based solely on a contractual 
interest.18  And that makes sense because allowing employers 
 
a basis for its asserted confidentiality interest.  It always relied 
upon the confidentiality provision.  
17 The ALJ also read the confidentiality provision as 
permitting disclosures to the Union.  We need not determine 
whether the ALJ’s reading was correct, because the provision, 
even if it did bar disclosure, did not create a valid 
confidentiality interest.   
18 Crozer cites Northern Indiana Public Service 
Company, 347 N.L.R.B. 210, 212 (2006), where the Board 
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to withhold relevant information on such a basis would allow 
private parties to undermine the NLRA’s statutory scheme.  We 
therefore agree with the ALJ that Crozer’s contractual interest 
here did not trump its statutory duty to furnish relevant 
information to the Union.  
  
 Because Crozer never established a legitimate and 
substantial confidentiality interest, it does not matter whether 
“Crozer was always willing to discuss and reasonably 
accommodate the Union’s request.”  Crozer Br. 31; see Watkins 
Contracting, Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 222, 226 (2001) (rejecting an 
employer’s assertion of confidentiality where the employer 
“only stated that the information should be held confidential 
and then asked if the Union would agree to sign a 
confidentiality agreement”).  Without a legitimate 
confidentiality interest, Crozer needed to provide all relevant 
information to the Union.  See Howard Indus., Inc., 360 
N.L.R.B. 891, 892 (2014) (“When a party is unable to establish 
confidentiality, no balancing of interests is required and it must 
disclose the information in full to the requesting party.”).19 
 
observed that “a promise of confidentiality is relevant to the 
issue of whether the information will be considered 
confidential.”  But in Northern Indiana, the Board found that 
“a legitimate and substantial confidentiality interest” existed 
beyond the promise of confidentiality itself.  Id. at 211.  That 
is not the case here.  
19 For this reason, Crozer’s reliance on Good Life 
Beverage Co. (Silver Bros. Co.), 312 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1993), is 
misplaced.  In that case, the union requested specific financial 
information that was undoubtedly confidential.  Id. at 1061.  
And so the Board found that, given the “substantial and 




 In sum, substantial evidence supports the Board’s 
conclusion that Crozer, in failing to provide the Union with 




 Crozer also challenges the Board’s remedy.  We 
conclude that the Board abused its discretion by issuing a 
punitive remedy.   
 
The Board’s remedial “power is a broad discretionary 
one, subject to limited judicial review.”  Fibreboard Paper 
Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at 216.  We accord “special respect” to 
the Board’s remedy because “the Board draws on a fund of 
knowledge and expertise all its own.”  NLRB v. Gissel Packing 
Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969).  As the Supreme Court has 
instructed, “courts must not enter the allowable area of the 
Board’s discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding 
unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more 
spacious domain of policy.”  Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 
883, 899 (1984) (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 
U.S. 177, 194 (1941)).  But at the same time, “the Board’s 
discretion to select and fashion remedies for violations of the 
NLRA, though generally broad, is not unlimited.”  Hoffman 
 
information,” the employer had a right to discuss its 
confidentiality concerns with the union, and that the union 
failed to engage in accommodative bargaining.  Id. at 1061–62.  
But Crozer, unlike the employer in Good Life Beverage, never 




Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 142–43 
(2002) (citations omitted).  
  
One relevant limit is that “Board orders may not be 
punitive or confiscatory and must be reasonably adapted to the 
situation that calls for redress.”  Frito-Lay, Inc. v. NLRB, 585 
F.2d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting NLRB v. Townhouse T.V. 
& Appliances, Inc., 531 F.2d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 1976)).  This is 
so because “[t]he function of the remedy in unfair labor cases 
is to restore the situation, as nearly as possible, to that which 
would have occurred but for the violation.”  Sys. Mgmt., Inc. 
v. NLRB, 901 F.2d 297, 308 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Kallmann 
v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 
 Here, the Board’s order –– directing Crozer to disclose 
the entire APA, with all schedules and attachments –– was not 
“tailored to the unfair labor practice it [wa]s intended to 
redress.”  Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 900.  As explained earlier, at 
least some of the APA is relevant, and Crozer’s unsuccessful 
confidentiality claim is not an impediment to production of that 
relevant information.  The ALJ was not specific, however, 
about which parts are relevant, perhaps because he ultimately 
ordered production of the entire APA.  It may be that other parts 
of the APA (including schedules and attachments) are not 
relevant.  And thus the Board, instead of restoring the situation 
to the status quo ante, placed the Union in a far more 
advantageous position vis-à-vis Crozer.  That is punitive, not 
restorative.  
 
 We are unaware of any precedent for ordering an 
employer to furnish information to a union that has not been 
established as relevant.  The cases relied upon by the Board 
hold that an employer that claims relevant information to be 
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confidential, yet never tries to substantiate or accommodate 
that claim, is not entitled to another round of bargaining and 
must produce that relevant information.  See, e.g., W. Penn 
Power Co., 339 N.L.R.B. 585, 586 (2003) (“Having violated 
the Act by refusing to provide relevant and necessary 
information, the Respondent is now obligated to produce the 
information.”).  But those cases all involved information that 
had been established as relevant.  In none of them did the Board 
order an employer to provide information where relevance had 
not been established.   
 
 The Board majority, for its part, defended its remedy on 
the grounds that Crozer, by failing to “engage in 
accommodative bargaining at the time they first asserted a 
confidentiality interest,” “unfairly imposed, and unjustly 
reaped the benefit of, an additional year of delay upon an 
uninformed bargaining partner.”  J.A. 6.  But that reasoning 
conflates the analytically distinct issues of relevance and 
confidentiality.  Confidentiality is a defense that an employer 
may invoke in response to a union’s request for relevant 
information.  Here, the Union never established the relevance 
of the entire APA, and thus Crozer cannot be faulted for failing 
to produce any irrelevant parts.  
  
 Again, we are mindful of the Board’s broad discretion 
in crafting remedies for violations of the NLRA.  But “the rule 
of deference to the Board’s choice of remedy does not 
constitute a blank check for arbitrary action.”  Detroit Edison, 
440 U.S. at 316.  The remedy for a failure to disclose relevant 
information is the disclosure of that relevant information, not 
the disclosure of other, irrelevant information.  In ordering 
disclosure of the entire APA, the Board abused its broad 




 Before concluding, we observe that the only part of the 
APA that the Union has yet to receive is its schedules and 
attachments (aside from schedules 4.13(a) and 4.18(a)).  Based 
on the list of schedules and attachments contained in the 
record, it may be that some of those schedules could be 
relevant, while others are not.  We hold just that the Board 
abused its discretion in ordering Crozer to disclose all of the 
schedules and attachments to the Union.  We leave it to the 
Board on remand to determine which schedules and 
attachments have been sufficiently established as relevant and 
thus which schedules and attachments the Union has a right to 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Crozer’s 
petition for review in part and deny it in part, grant the Board’s 
cross-petition in part and deny it in part, and remand to the 
Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
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BIBAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. 
I join my colleagues in holding that Crozer did not show a 
confidentiality interest in the sale agreement. And I agree that 
the Board’s remedy was punitive. So I too would grant 
Crozer’s petition for review. But I write separately because I 
cannot join Part III.A of the majority’s opinion. 
Unions and employers must bargain in good faith. The em-
ployer here, Crozer, agreed to be bought by a third party, and 
the two signed an acquisition agreement. Soon after, Crozer 
told Union members about the upcoming sale and explained its 
effects, even though it had no duty to do so. The Union then 
asked to see the whole agreement. But the agreement’s scope 
was broad. It orchestrated a multi-million-dollar sale, so it con-
tained heaps of sensitive financial information not relevant to 
the Union. To be sure, some parts touched on topics near and 
dear to employees, like pensions and healthcare benefits. Rec-
ognizing this, Crozer repeatedly put these parts on the table, 
ready for the Union’s taking. 
The Union said no. From the very start, it wanted the whole 
agreement. But it never justified why the entire document, not 
just the parts affecting employees, was relevant. And despite 
Crozer’s repeated offers to turn over these parts, the Union 
would not budge. It wanted all or nothing. 
Nothing it got, and nothing it deserved. The Union did not 
satisfy its statutory duty to act in good faith. By contrast, 
Crozer consistently acted in good faith, so it did not violate the 
National Labor Relations Act. But in the face of the governing 
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statute and precedent, the majority holds otherwise. I respect-
fully disagree. 
I. THE UNION DID NOT JUSTIFY WHY IT NEEDED THE 
WHOLE AGREEMENT 
The Act requires employers and unions “to bargain collec-
tively” with each other. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3). That 
duty, in turn, requires the two sides “to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment.” § 158(d). 
These topics are “the subjects of mandatory bargaining.” NLRB 
v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 
(1958). 
These terse statutory commands have spawned many du-
ties. One is relevant here: as part of its duty to confer in good 
faith, an employer must give unions the information they need 
to perform their duties properly. N.J. Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 
720 F.2d 789, 790–91 (3d Cir. 1983). That makes sense. Infor-
mation asymmetries plague labor relations, and an employer 
could hurt unions by hoarding key information. 
The Supreme Court has compared this duty to civil discov-
ery, and it comes with similar triggers and limits. See NLRB v. 
Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967). To start, the union 
must make a request for information that is “specific” enough 
“to apprise the company of what information is sought.” NLRB 
v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 936 F.2d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 1991). And the 
request must include facts that “support[ ]  an objective basis” 
for the union’s concerns. Hertz Corp. v. NLRB, 105 F.3d 868, 
874 (3d Cir. 1997). So a “union’s bare assertion that it needs 
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information . . . does not automatically oblige the employer to 
supply all the information in the manner requested.” Detroit 
Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314 (1979).  
Or at least that is how it is supposed to work. It did not hap-
pen here. The Union never made a specific request for infor-
mation grounded in the facts. As the majority recounts, Pro-
spect agreed to buy Crozer in a multi-million-dollar deal. Their 
hundred-page-long contract covered everything from tax pro-
rations to antitrust compliance. That contract also came with 
seventy-seven exhibits and schedules. Taken together, these 
documents touched on Crozer’s most sensitive information. 
Here is a sample: 
• Crozer’s intellectual property;  
• The condition of all Crozer assets and any material 
defects;  
• Any insurance policies on those assets and the de-
tails of those policies;  
• Any significant contracts to which Crozer was a 
party;  
• Any investigations into Crozer that were pending or 
threatened; and  
• Any litigation or proceedings involving Crozer.  
To be sure, the agreement also touched on topics that matter to 
the Union’s members, like employee benefits.  
Soon after entering the contract, Crozer told the Union of 
the sale and reassured it that many key employment terms 
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would stay the same. The Union then asked for “the complete 
Asset Purchase Agreement and all attachments and schedule[s] 
of the agreement.” App. 67. But it never explained why it 
needed the whole agreement. Crozer responded that the whole 
agreement was not relevant to bargaining and that it would con-
sider alternative requests. The Union stuck to its guns, again 
asking for the whole agreement “with attachments and sched-
ules.” App. 70. Again, it offered no explanation. 
The Union did not have to say much. It could have asked 
for all contractual terms affecting mandatory-bargaining sub-
jects like wages or benefits. That information is presumptively 
relevant. Or it could have asked Crozer to prove every claim it 
made about the sale, from the transaction’s effect on hospital 
closings to its treatment of pensions. See Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp. 
v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 366, 371 (3d Cir. 1967). Or it could have 
thrown a Hail Mary and tried to justify why it needed the whole 
agreement. But it did none of that. 
Instead, the Union simply asserted that it needed the whole 
agreement “for effects bargaining.” App. 67. In other words, 
the Union needed the agreement because it was relevant, and it 
was relevant because the Union needed it. That circularity does 
not satisfy the Union’s burden. The Union puts forth all sorts 
of justifications now, but we cannot consider them. Hertz, 105 
F.3d at 873–74. So we are left with no justification at all. 
The whole agreement was not relevant; the majority does 
not contest that. See Maj. Op. 16–17. But, as the majority cor-
rectly notes, the agreement contained some relevant infor-
mation. Maj. Op. 17. According to the majority, Crozer had to 
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give the Union those relevant parts of the agreement. The Un-
ion, however, did not ask for that particular information; it 
asked for the whole agreement. And the Union’s burden is to 
justify its request then and there, not to make an overbroad, 
boilerplate request and hope that a court will later find some 
subset relevant. By cabining its inquiry, the majority lets the 
Union off the hook. 
II. THE UNION CANNOT RELY ON PRESUMPTIONS OR  
CONTEXT 
Finding no help in the general standard, the Union seeks 
refuge elsewhere in our law. First, it tries to escape its burden 
through a limited exception. Second, it claims that the context 
made an explanation unnecessary. Neither argument works. 
To start, the Union claims that the whole agreement was 
presumptively relevant. “[W]age and related information per-
taining to employees in the bargaining unit is presumptively 
relevant.” Curtiss-Wright Corp., Wright Aeronautical Div. v. 
NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1965). A union need not “show 
[its] precise relevance.” Id. But the presumption applies only 
to information about “the core of the employer-employee rela-
tionship”—that is, mandatory-bargaining subjects. Id. While 
parts of the agreement touched that core, the Union’s blanket 
request went well beyond it. The Union swung for the fences, 
but it missed. So it gets no help here. 
The Union’s context argument also fails. Take a step back: 
When Crozer first told the Union of its upcoming sale, it reas-
sured Union members that “many things at Crozer-Keystone 
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[would] not change.” App. 59. Hospitals would stay open, un-
ionized employees could keep working, and key services 
would remain or grow. Crozer also preemptively answered 
more than thirty questions, including how the sale would 
change pensions and healthcare benefits. All in all, it gave Un-
ion members eight pages of detailed information about how the 
sale would affect them.  
Nothing forced Crozer to give out this information up front. 
It was an olive branch. But because of that good-faith gesture, 
the Union says, Crozer made the whole agreement relevant and 
had to turn it all over. There are indeed times when the context 
of a request makes any further justification unnecessary. In that 
situation, the employer must disclose—no questions asked. See 
Hertz, 105 F.3d at 874. 
This is not one of those times. At most, the context here 
made relevant only those provisions that touched on employee-
related issues. If the Union had asked for only those provisions, 
it might have been entitled to them without further explanation. 
But the Union asked for the whole contract, not just for those 
provisions. So it cannot benefit from this exception, and 
Crozer’s good deed should go unpunished. 
In holding that the context here required disclosure, the ma-
jority emphasizes Crozer’s letter to the Union about the Pro-
spect sale. Maj. Op. 23–25. So I worry that the majority’s hold-
ing will perversely discourage employers from giving employ-
ees extra information at the outset. That sort of disclosure ben-
efits unions and their members, but employers may no longer 
be so forthcoming. If Crozer had said nothing, this appeal 
might have come out the other way. The takeaway for future 
7 
employers is as clear as it is troubling: choose silence over 
transparency. 
III.  THE UNION’S BROAD REQUEST DID NOT REQUIRE 
CROZER TO TURN OVER SPECIFIC PARTS  
OF THE AGREEMENT 
So the Union keeps looking for shelter. Its next argument 
goes like this: even though the whole agreement was not rele-
vant, some parts were, and Crozer’s blanket request for the 
whole agreement required Crozer to turn over those relevant 
parts. In other words, employers facing overbroad requests 
must ferret through their haystacks and turn over any needles 
that they find. The majority buys that argument and crafts an 
even more troubling rule. But the authority for these rules is 
shaky. Crozer kept offering to turn over the relevant parts. The 
Union rejected those offers and should reap no reward for its 
stubbornness. 
A. Beware the Union’s rule 
I turn first to the Act. That is not where the Board starts. 
After decades of agency precedents, the Board has lost sight of 
its foundational grant of authority from Congress. A reminder: 
the Act requires employers to “meet [with employee represent-
atives] at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect 
to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). The statute says nothing about in-
formation requests, let alone overbreadth. 
So we turn to the agency’s interpretations of the Act, to 
which we owe deference. The administrative law judge here 
pointed to one: “an employer may not simply refuse to comply 
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with an ambiguous or overbroad information request, but must 
request clarification and/or comply with the request to the ex-
tent it encompasses necessary and relevant information.” App. 
13 (quoting agency decisions). The Union asks us to adopt that 
rule as our own. 
But this rule has a few problems. First, it is a bright-line 
rule. A categorical approach to the statute strays from what the 
Supreme Court has told us should be a fact-bound, case-by-
case inquiry. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153–54 
(1956). Though the statutory requirement of good faith is 
amorphous, it at least requires the Board to analyze the facts of 
each case. Faced with a conflict between the Board and the Su-
preme Court, we should follow the Court’s lead. 
Second, the rule could let unions make overbroad requests 
and leave it to the employer to winnow the wheat from the 
chaff. What is to stop a union from asking every month for all 
available information, and leaving it to the employer to turn 
over anything relevant? On the Board’s view, perhaps nothing 
at all. Not only would that undercut the case-by-case inquiry 
into good faith, but it would flip the burden from the union to 
the employer. 
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B. Even if an overbroad request is okay, Crozer  
complied with the Board’s rule 
But assume that the Board has it right, and even an over-
broad request calls for “clarification and/or” partial compli-
ance. Keauhou Beach Hotel, 298 N.L.R.B. 702, 702 (1990); 
see also Norris, a Dover Res. Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.3d 1161, 1171 
(10th Cir. 2005) (enforcing this rule). This rule is disjunctive, 
so employers can comply by either clarifying or complying. 
Crozer did both. 
To start, Crozer did ask the Union to clarify its request. Af-
ter the overbroad request, Crozer told the Union that “the entire 
APA is not relevant for effects bargaining over the terms and 
conditions of employment of bargaining unit members.” App. 
69. Then it said that it was “open to considering any alternative 
requests [the Union] may have.” Id. By explaining that the re-
quest was overbroad and asking the Union to make an alterna-
tive, narrower request, Crozer met its duty to follow up. But 
the Union did not clarify, narrow, or justify its request. Instead, 
it again asked for the whole agreement.  
Crozer also offered to give the Union the relevant parts of 
the agreement. In a letter to the Union, Crozer said that its law-
yer had “offered to discuss with [the Union] the potential for 
production of those portions of the Asset Purchase Agreement 
and any attachments and schedules thereto that relate to or af-
fect [Crozer] employees, including those who are members of 
[the Union].” App. 72. And the letter renewed that offer. 
Two Union employees also testified that Crozer made the 
same offer orally. A Union representative said that Crozer’s 
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lead negotiator had “offered up the relevant portions of the” 
sale agreement. App. 206. And the Union’s executive director 
confirmed that Crozer’s lead negotiator “may have also said 
that they would be willing to determine what was relevant and 
share that with the Union.” App. 253. The executive director 
agreed that Crozer specifically discussed “produc[ing] the por-
tions relevant to employees.” App. 266.  
Despite Crozer’s oral and written offers to produce the rel-
evant parts of the agreement, the majority claims that Crozer 
“refused to provide any” part of the agreement. Maj. Op. 3. But 
Crozer made exactly the offer that the majority says it did not. 
So it satisfied both parts of the Board’s overbreadth rule. 
C. Fear the majority’s rule 
The majority casts aside the Board’s overbreadth rule and 
crafts its own: An employer, faced with an overbroad infor-
mation request, must somehow identify and produce the rele-
vant parts. Then, for any parts not produced, the employer must 
explain why it withheld those parts. Maj. Op. 30.  
The Board did not ask for this rule. Nor did the Union. So 
where does the majority get it? It imports it wholesale from the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Maj. Op. 27–30. Now, the 
Supreme Court has compared the information-exchange pro-
cess to federal civil discovery, calling it a “discovery-type 
standard.” Acme Indus., 385 U.S. at 437. We have recognized 
this analogy before. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 936 F.2d at 150. But 
that is as far as the Supreme Court has gone—an analogy. It 
has never found that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gov-
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ern. And for good reason: we must assess the exchange of in-
formation case by case. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
emphasized, “[e]ach case must turn upon its particular facts.” 
Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. at 153. This is true of both the em-
ployer’s duty to disclose and “the type of disclosure that will 
satisfy that duty.” Detroit Edison Co., 440 U.S. at 314–15. In 
short, whether an employer acted in good faith is fact-specific. 
Yet the majority borrows a categorical rule. 
That rule is not only categorical, but also unworkable. Like 
the Board’s rule, it licenses fishing expeditions. Unions no 
longer need justify their requests, but can just ask for monthly 
data dumps. And it discourages bargaining in good faith. Here, 
the Union submitted a bare-bones request; it demanded the 
whole Agreement and refused to say which parts it thought rel-
evant. Under the majority’s rule, Crozer had to pore over it all, 
including its many exhibits and schedules, and guess what in-
formation would be relevant. Crozer then had to give the Union 
those parts of the agreement, even though the Union had re-
peatedly rejected Crozer’s offers to do just that. So Crozer is 
punished for failing to give the Union the parts it had rejected. 
So much for good faith.  
IV. THE UNION DID NOT ACT IN GOOD FAITH 
It bears repeating: The Act requires both employers and 
Union representatives to “confer in good faith.” 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d). In failure-to-disclose cases, “[t]he inquiry must al-
ways be whether or not under the circumstances of the partic-
ular case the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith has 
been met.” Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. at 153–54. 
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This case showcases the risks of departing from that case-
by-case inquiry. The Union repeatedly did not act in good faith. 
It refused to accept the information that it now seeks. It repeat-
edly rebuffed Crozer’s offers to turn over the agreement’s rel-
evant parts. And it had no good reason for doing so. The Union 
knew the agreement contained irrelevant information. For in-
stance, it knew that the contract affected Crozer locations 
where no Union employees worked. Yet the Union made its 
overbroad request anyway. It later admitted its real motivation: 
it wanted a peek at Crozer’s finances, not just at employment-
related terms.  
This lack of good faith should be central to our analysis. 
The majority’s presumptions and categorical rules obscure 
these damning facts. But the Supreme Court mandates a case-
by-case approach, and we should apply it. Doing so makes 
clear that this Union did not act in good faith. It should not now 
reap the Act’s benefits. 
* * * * * 
This circuit rarely opines on the Board’s interpretations of 
labor law. When we do, we must pay special care to the rules 
we approve and pronounce. Today, this Court faults an em-
ployer for sharing, in good faith, information about an upcom-
ing sale. It flips the burden from unions to employers to decide 
what is relevant, upending a decades-old scheme by analogiz-
ing too literally to civil discovery. It blesses agency actions that 
are unmoored from the governing statute. And it overlooks key 
facts in the record. So I respectfully dissent from Part III.A of 
the majority’s decision, but join the rest. 
